

Intentionality and the Harmony between Thought and Reality – A rejoinder to Professor Crane

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1. *Misunderstandings and misrepresentations*

Wittgenstein's discussion of the subject of intentionality, both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Investigations*, is difficult to understand. It is of capital importance, both for the understanding of his philosophy and its development, and for understanding much that is confused about current reflections on intentionality. In 'Wittgenstein and Intentionality' (this journal, Vol. XVII (Fall 2010), pp. 88-104), Professor Tim Crane attempts 'to examine the place of the concept of intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and to criticize one aspect of his treatment of intentionality' (p. 88). Professor Crane's examination is defective. His criticism is misconceived. And his remedial proposal is unintelligible. The purpose of this rejoinder is to make clear the thrust of Wittgenstein's two different investigations into the problems of intentionality. I shall correct Professor Crane's misunderstandings, and show how deep and ramifying Wittgenstein's results are.

In the course of Professor Crane's discussion he criticizes my explanation of Wittgenstein's successive accounts of intentionality. He attributes to me views I do not hold, and also views that I have explicitly rejected. Indeed, he supposes my statement of the problem of intentionality as the young Wittgenstein saw it to be a statement of his solution to it. Despite his intention to criticize my views, Professor Crane has not read my primary examination of Wittgenstein's investigations into intentionality in *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will*,¹ but only the brief discussion in my *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy* and an article 'An Orrery of Intentionality'.² That was written for readers familiar with Wittgenstein's work, and may have proved too compressed. I shall not dwell on Professor Crane's misrepresentations of my writings, but I shall correct the more bizarre ones in footnotes.

Professor Crane begins by remarking that the word 'intentionality' is not – to his knowledge –

¹ A comprehensive discussion of the subject is to be found in a forty eight page essay of mine entitled 'Intentionality' in *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will*, Part I: Essays (pp.1-48). A paragraph by paragraph exegesis of Wittgenstein's discussion of intentionality in the *Investigations* §§428-65 is to be found in *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will*, Part II: Exegesis §§428-93, pp. 3-98. I also discussed the matter in *Insight and Illusion: themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), chaps. 3 and 5.

² P. M. S. Hacker, 'An Orrery of Intentionality', *Language and Communication* 21 (2001), pp. 119-141.

used in Wittgenstein's writings. Since Wittgenstein wrote in German, that is not surprising. But his German term of art 'Intention' (which is connected to, but does not mean the same as 'Absicht') is Wittgenstein's expression for the Latin *intentio*, from which our 'intentionality' and Brentano's 'Intentionalität' are derived.³ According to the Bergen transcription, this term occurs 224 times in Wittgenstein's writings, *most* of which concern the intentionality of thought and language, and not simply *Absicht*. There is an explicit discussion of Brentano on intentionality in one of Wittgenstein's dictations to Friedrich Waismann, although it is doubtful whether he had actually read Brentano.⁴

Professor Crane notes correctly that Wittgenstein sometimes characterized the core problem of intentionality as the problem of the 'harmony between thought and reality' (e.g. PI §428). Indeed Wittgenstein also characterized it, with a deliberately Leibnizean allusion, as the '*pre-established* harmony between thought and reality' (e.g. BT 189). The moot question is what he meant by this enigmatic phrase. Professor Crane (pp. 88f., 93) takes it to refer to the observations that the wish for it to be the case that *p* is the wish that is fulfilled by its being the case that *p*, that the thought that *p* is the thought that is made true by the fact that *p*, or that the order to V is the order that is obeyed by V-ing. But that is mistaken. Wittgenstein himself explained:

The agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists in this: that if I say falsely that something is *red*, then all the same, it is *red* that it isn't. And in this: that if I want to explain the word "red" to someone, in the sentence "That is not red", I should do so by pointing to something that *is* red. (PI §429).

The agreement or harmony between thought and reality is not (as Professor Crane supposes) an agreement of truth (satisfaction, obedience). It is an agreement that obtains (is pre-established) between thought and reality *no matter whether the thought is true or false, the wish fulfilled or not fulfilled, the order obeyed or disobeyed*. What did Wittgenstein have in mind? Again, he explained quite clearly in the *Big Typescript* (p. 188v): it is the *pictoriality*

³ The term 'intentio' first occurs in a Latin translation of Avicenna's explanation of Aristotle's account of thought. It was a rendering of Al-farabi's and Avicenna's terms *ma'na* and *ma'qul*.

⁴ Gordon Baker ed. *The Voices of Wittgenstein* (Routledge, London, 2003), dictation entitled 'Brentano', pp. 443-51

of thought (and language). This takes us back to the *Tractatus* account of representation. It is there (and in the antecedent *Notebooks 1914-1916*) that Wittgenstein first grappled with the problems of the intentionality of thought and language, and offered his first solution to the problems as he saw them. The so called picture theory of representation was an attempt to give a sublime metaphysical explanation of the pictoriality of thought and proposition.

2. *The Tractatus account of intentionality*

Three great problems dominate the *Tractatus*: the nature of representation; the nature of logical necessity; and the nature of what cannot be said, but is shown by what can be said.

The nature of representation is delineated in the so called picture theory (this is *not* Wittgenstein's nomenclature). *One* way in which the problem of representation presented itself to Wittgenstein was by means of the following three irresistible ideas:

- i. When one thinks truly that things are so, then what one thinks is what is the case.
- ii. When one thinks falsely that things are so, then what one thinks is not what is the case.
- iii. What one thinks when one thinks truly that *p* and what one thinks when one thinks falsely that *p* is the same – for in both cases what one thinks is that *p*.

Each of these seems right, and yet it seems they *cannot* all be right. (This, as Wittgenstein observed, is the general form of all deep philosophical predicaments: *it cannot be so, and yet it must be so!*).

One can put the same problem slightly differently: how can one think what is *not* the case? As Wittgenstein put it in his *Notebooks 1914-1916*:

If a picture presents what-is-not-the-case ... this only happens through its presenting *that* which *is* not the case.

For the picture says, as it were, '*This* is how it is *not*' and to the question '*How* is it

not?' just the positive proposition is the answer. (NB 25)

This strange puzzle, which is repeated in *Investigations* §429 (quoted above), lies at the heart of the picture theory of the proposition – it is the puzzle of negation:

That shadow which the picture as it were casts upon the world: How am I to get an exact grasp of it?

Here is a deep mystery.

It is the mystery of negation: This is not how things are, and yet we can say *how* things are *not*. (NB 30)

It is not surprising that Wittgenstein later (BT 217; PI §518) associated the problem with Plato's discussion of false thought in the *Theaetetus*:

Socrates: And if he thinks, he thinks something, doesn't he?

Theaetetus: Necessarily.

Socrates: And when he thinks something, he thinks a thing that is?

Theaetetus: I agree

Socrates: So to think what is not is to think nothing.

Theaetetus: Clearly.

Socrates: But surely to think nothing is the same as not to think at all.

Theaetetus: That seems plain.

Socrates: If so, it is impossible to think what is not . . . (*Theaetetus* 189a)

Of course, this is absurd. We *can* think what is not the case. But if what we think when we think truly is what is the case – then it seems that there is nothing to think when we think falsely.

Frege handled the problem in a very simple way.⁵ Thinking, he supposed, is a dual

⁵ Professor Crane ascribes to me the view that it was *because* Frege failed to see that thought and what makes it true are internally related that he had to postulate senses to mediate between thought and reality (p. 91). That is mistaken. In his mature writings, Frege postulated thoughts (as opposed to judgeable-contents, in his early work) as objects of thinking for a large variety of reasons internal to his function-theoretic semantics. The point I made was that Frege's introduction of senses of sentences as modes of presentation of truth-values ensured that there is something to think even if what one thinks is false, but the price he paid was that what one thinks when one thinks truly that things are thus-and-so is not what is the case.

relation between a thinker and a thought. What we think is a thought or proposition. So when we think falsely, we think a thought that is false, and when we think truly we think a thought that is true – so there is something to think no matter whether we think truly or falsely. But this simple solution is purchased at an intolerable price. For on Frege’s account, what we think is never what is the case. But that seems absurd: for when we think truly that it is raining, then what we think is what is in fact the case, namely: *that it is raining*. Thought must be capable of reaching right up to reality. It must not fall short of it (as it does on Frege’s account). And when we think falsely that things are so, what we think is *not* what is the case. As Arthur Prior was later to put it in his criticism of Frege: ‘we must resist above all things the madness which insulates what we think from any possibility of directly clashing with what is so.’⁶ To put matters in the terms of the 1910s (as Wittgenstein unsurprisingly did), the thought that *p* is *internally related* to the fact that *p* that makes it true. That is: the thought that *p would not be* the thought that *p* were it not the thought that is made true by the fact that *p*.⁷ So too, the thought that *p* would not be the thought it is, were it not the thought that is made false by its not being the case that *p*. This *internal relation* is not (as Professor Crane suggests (p. 96)) a *postulate* of the *Tractatus*. It is, or was conceived to be, undeniable (*Wesensschau*).

Russell, like Moore, was initially tempted to think that what we think when we think truly is a fact (which he called a true proposition – such propositions (as he then thought)

⁶ Arthur Prior, *Objects of Thought* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), p. 52.

⁷ The terms ‘internal property’ and ‘internal relation’ were common philosophical jargon of the day, not special Wittgensteinian terms of art. Professor Crane (p. 92 and note 4) suggests that after 1929, Wittgenstein ceased using this terminology (although he cites two loci known to him in which Wittgenstein does use the terms). In fact Wittgenstein used the terms approximately 180 times after 1929 according to the Bergen transcriptions. Professor Crane attributes to me the suggestion that the idea that the thought that *p* and the state of affairs the existence of which makes it true are internally related is THE fundamental insight of the *Tractatus* (p. 91). Of course it is not, and I did not suggest that it is. What I wrote was that it is A fundamental insight (*Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*, p. 31). According to Wittgenstein himself, his fundamental thought (his *Grundgedanke*) was that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives (TLP 4.0312)! I have suggested elsewhere that the idea of the bipolarity of the proposition is no less fundamental.

being non-linguistic entities constituting reality). But the consequence of this was that what we think when we think truly that p is distinct from what we think when we think falsely that p . And that seemed absurd. Russell abandoned this dual relation conception in favour of a ‘multiple relation theory of belief’.⁸ On that account, Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio binds together the terms Othello, loving, Desdemona, Cassio in the following order: Believes (Othello, loving, Desdemona, Cassio). If it is a fact that Desdemona loves Cassio (Loves (Desdemona, Cassio)), then the belief is true. Otherwise it is false. On this account belief is a multiple relation between a believer and the constituents of belief. The young Wittgenstein blew a hole right through this account with his observation that nothing in Russell’s theory excluded the intelligibility of believing a nonsense.⁹ Russell was devastated and abandoned his work on the 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* manuscript.

How did young Wittgenstein propose to handle the problem that had defeated his two great predecessors? How can one square the three seemingly irresistible propositions

- (i) that what we think when we think truly is what is the case (and not some third thing that stands between our thought and what is the case)
- (ii) that what we think when we think falsely is not what is the case
- (iii) that what we think when we think truly that p does not differ from what we think when we think falsely that p

His answer was complex. On the one hand, it is obvious that what we think when we think truly is not *identical* with the fact that makes our thought true. A thought or proposition, Wittgenstein then held, is indeed a fact (TLP 2.141) – it is *a representing fact*. For, he held,

⁸ Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, Chap. 12.

⁹ Wittgenstein: ‘Notes on Logic’, in *Notebooks 1914-1916* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1961), p. 96, repeated in the *Tractatus* 5.5422: ‘The correct explanation of the form of the proposition ‘A judges that p ’ must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement.’ For discussion of the matter, see *Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy*, pp. 13f., 26f.

only a fact can express a sense (TLP 3.142). Only a fact can represent a fact (just as only a simple name can represent a simple object and only a relation can represent a relation).

Obviously the representing fact is distinct from the represented fact even if the thought is true, a fortiori if it is false – for then *there is* no represented fact.¹⁰ But even then, *something* is represented. How can that be? Wittgenstein's solution was to construct a metaphysics of modal realism (realism concerning metaphysical possibilities). What a thought or proposition represents *is a possibility* – a state of affairs, that may or may not be actualized. In order for a thought or proposition to be capable of depicting such a possibility, there must be *something* identical between the representing fact (the thought or proposition) and the state of affairs represented:

If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts.

There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable one to be a picture of the other at all.

What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in the way it does, is its pictorial form. (TLP 2.16–2.17)

So, to put matters in his later manner – the agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality, *is an agreement of form*. *That*, he thought, is what constitutes the pictoriality (intentionality) of thought and proposition alike. Every picture is at the same time a logical picture. Thoughts are pure logical pictures. Logical pictures can depict the world. A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts – what represents and what is represented are *isomorphic*. A picture depicts reality by representing *the possibility* of the

¹⁰ Professor Crane attributes to me the idea that when one thinks truly that *p* what one thinks is *identical* with the fact that *p*. Indeed, he suggests that I ascribe this idea to Wittgenstein. The supposition that there is an *identity* here is part of the problem, not of the solution (It has to be identical and yet it cannot be identical!). Professor Crane rightly says that I hold that if what one thinks is true then what one thinks is what is the case – and immediately goes on 'In other words, the true thought is identical to the fact: this is how thought "reaches right up to reality".' But these are *his* words, not mine. There *seems* to be an identity here, but there cannot be – that is the problem, not its solution!

obtaining and non-obtaining of states of affairs (TLP 2.151, 2.201).

This solves the problem as Wittgenstein then understood it. What we think when we think truly is indeed what is the case – it is the possibility that is actualized by reality, by the facts. What we think when we think falsely is not what is the case, since the possibility we think has not been actualized – it is not the case, things are not in fact thus. What we think when we think truly that p and what we think when we think falsely that p is indeed the same possibility – the same state of affairs. But the price of this elegant solution was high. It involved a metaphysics of sempiternal simple objects constituting the substance of the world; it involved the thought of objects belonging to sharply determinate categories, with rigidly determined combinatorial possibilities; it involved the idea that the world consists of facts, and that facts consist of objects in concatenation. On the representing side, it involved the thought that a language, including the language of thought, consists of simple names (or simple thought-constituents) the meanings of which are simple objects in reality, that simple names combine to form elementary propositions which are logically independent of each other, that all logical necessity is to be explained in terms of truth-functional combinations of elementary propositions. *Above all*, it involved the thought that the intentionality (pictoriality) of thought and proposition involved a *metalogical* relation between what represents (thoughts, propositions, etc.) and what is represented. A metalogical relation, in Wittgenstein's idiosyncratic use of this expression (before it acquired its current sense) was conceived to be a relation that is presupposed by the very possibility of thought, language and logic. The pre-established harmony – the agreement of logical form – between thought and reality was conceived to be, in this sense, metalogical. It is what makes representation possible. All this Wittgenstein later repudiated.

Wittgenstein never suggested that a true thought or proposition is identical with the fact that makes it true. Professor Crane multiplies confusion by suggesting that

Of course, “fact” can mean a number of different things. In one usage, a fact is just a truth – a fact is “a thought [*Gedanke*] that is true” as Frege puts it. On another usage, a fact is something in the world, something on an ontological level with objects and properties, something that makes truths true. (p. 91)

This is confused. These are not usages, but *misuses* – the first being the misuse of Frege (repeated by Strawson), the second a misuse of the young Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* (repeated by Austin and Searle). These are philosophical blunders, not alternative usages.

Facts are not true propositions. It makes no sense to say ‘One fact about Jack is the true proposition that he went up the hill’, even though one can say ‘One fact about Jack is that he went up the hill’, and also ‘One true proposition about Jack is that he went up the hill’. A true proposition may be detailed, but a fact cannot. The fact that Jack went up the hill, but not the true proposition that Jack went up the hill, may be deplorable, regrettable, or unfortunate, it may be a miracle or only natural. The sentence ‘Jack went up the hill’ may be used to *express* a true proposition, but to *state* a fact. The violent death of Archimedes at Syracuse is a fact, but not a true proposition. Facts, but not true propositions, are said to be hard or stubborn, to speak for themselves. We admire those who face the facts (but not the true propositions) undaunted. Jack may have gone up the hill, despite the fact that he was ill, but not despite the true proposition that he was ill.

Facts are not ‘things in the world’ on the same ‘ontological level’ as objects and properties. It is a fact that Harold died at the Battle of Hastings in 1066, but that fact is neither in Hastings nor in 1066. It did not come into existence in Hastings in 1066. It did not cease to be a fact in 1067, or in London. Facts have no spatio-temporal location. Contrary to

the *Tractatus*, as Wittgenstein himself later came to realise, *the world does not consist of facts*. Rather, a description of (some features of) the world consists of a statement of facts. That is not an ‘ontological’ or ‘metaphysical’ truth, but a humble grammatical statement that licenses the inter-substitutability of expressions, namely ‘a description of how things stand’ and ‘a statement of the facts’.

Professor Crane further errs in suggesting that some facts, like the fact that Magellan circumnavigated the globe, ‘take place’ or ‘go on in the world’, and that some facts are parts of ‘what happened’ (p. 97). But it is events that take place or go on – not facts. Facts obtain, but they do not go on, occur or happen. While events have a temporal and usually also a spatial location – facts have neither. Events commonly begin, go on for a while, may have different phases that are indeed part of what happened, and then come to an end. Facts neither begin nor go on, they do not have phases, and they do not come to an end.

So much for the core idea of pictoriality or intentionality. I have not touched on the account of what, in the *Tractatus*, makes a representing fact represent the state of affairs it represents. To this Wittgenstein gave a brief answer – which he later came to see was quite wrong. His answer was: by *being projected* on to what it represents. The method of projection, he wrote, is *thinking the sense of the sentence* (TLP 3.11)¹¹ – i.e. *meaning* by the sentence ‘*p*’ the state of affairs the obtaining of which will make it true and the non-obtaining of which will make it false. As he later wrote (before he saw through the confusion): intention (i.e. meaning (*meinen*)) is the method of projection (MS 108, 219). Thinking, meaning, are intrinsically intentional – and it is, he then held, the *intrinsic intentionality of thought* that breathes life into otherwise dead signs. This conception, without the associated logical

¹¹ I have here corrected the translation of this passage. It could also be rendered ‘thinking the sense of the proposition’, but *not* ‘thinking *of* the sense of the proposition’.

atomism, was to be revived by John Searle in his book *Intentionality* (1983), fifty years after Wittgenstein had definitively refuted and repudiated it.

3. Wittgenstein's later account of intentionality

In his later philosophy (that finds its most complete expression in the *Investigations*), Wittgenstein abandoned the very idea of *metalogical* investigations into the foundations of logic and language. Neither logic nor language *have* foundations. Just as there is no metaphysics, he wrote, so too there is no metalogic (MS 110, 189). The word 'fundamental' cannot signify anything metalogical (MS 110, 194). The expression 'agreement with reality' is not a metalogical one, but rather a part of ordinary language (MS 113, 49v; cf. MS 115, 85). Contrary to what he had earlier thought, such words as 'understanding' and 'meaning (*meinen*)' are not metalogical (MS 114, 2 & 27; MS 140, 8). What is needed is not *Wesensschau* – metaphysical insight into the ultimate nature of things, nor metalogical investigations into the foundations of representation, but rather a patient sifting of grammatical facts – of the ways in which we use words. What we need is a perspicuous representation of the use of our words (PI §122).¹² For this will shed light on our bewilderment, show us where we went astray and why.

So, for example, it is perfectly correct to say that what one thinks, when one thinks truly, is what is the case. As the *Tractatus* put it, what one thinks must not fall short of what is the case. But of course, it *cannot* be identical with what is the case on pain (i) of one's thinking nothing when one thinks falsely, or (ii) of thinking something different when one thinks truly that *p* from what one thinks when one thinks falsely that *p*, or (iii) supposing

¹² Not, as Professor Crane suggests, 'of the phenomena themselves' (p. 89). Science may give a perspicuous representation of the phenomena it studies. Philosophy gives a perspicuous representation of the *grammar* by means of which phenomena are described.

absurdly that the representing fact is identical with the represented fact. The *Tractatus* solution was that there must be something different (the representing fact differs from the represented one) and there must be something the same (logico-pictorial form). Thought and proposition alike can reach right up to reality because their psychic constituents and their logically simple names respectively have as their meanings the objects that are constituents of possibilities (of states of affairs). That is how language is *pinned* to reality, and how thought reaches right up to it. Now Wittgenstein brushed all that aside as a mythology of symbolism.

What had looked like an identity, but obviously could not be one: namely that what one thinks when one thinks truly *is* what is the case, has a very simple grammatical elucidation.¹³ In ‘what one thinks’ and in ‘what is the case’, the Wh-pronoun is not a relative one. If A expects Jill to come, and Jill comes, then that was precisely what A expected. But it was not *the same* as A expected (cf. PR 68f.). If A thought that *p*, and it was the case that *p*, then what A thought was indeed what was the case. But it was not *the same* as what was the case (of course, it was not *different either*). We are barking up the wrong tree – mesmerized by the ‘what-s’! – If A ordered both Jack and Jill to go up the hill, and both obeyed, then what Jack did was the same as what Jill did. Same *what?* – Why, same *act* of course! But if A orders Jack to do something, and Jack obeys him, Jack does *what* A ordered. But he does not do *the same* as A ordered – and one cannot ask ‘Same what?’ *It is perfectly correct* that if A thinks that *p*, and it is the case that *p*, then what A thinks is what is the case. What that means is that *the questions* ‘What did A think?’ and ‘What was the case?’ here *receive the same answer!* Moreover, if A thinks that *p*, and it is not the case that *p*, then it follows that what A thinks is what is *not* the case (and not something else, such as *q*, *r*, or *s*). How can this be? *It*

¹³ As is explained in detail in *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will*, Part I – Essays, p. 43, and Part II, Exegesis of §459, 2.1.

is all done in language (PI §445) – not between language and reality. The harmony between thought and reality is orchestrated *in grammar* – not between mind and world; nor between word and world. How can that be?

What appeared to be a meta-logical agreement between thought, language, and reality is no more than a grammatical nexus between expressions:

‘the thought that p ’ = ‘the thought made true by the fact that p ’ = ‘the thought made false by the fact that not- p ’

‘the proposition that p ’ = ‘the proposition made true by the fact that p ’ = ‘the proposition made false by the fact that not- p ’.

‘the expectation that event e will occur’ = ‘the expectation fulfilled by the occurrence of e ’ = ‘the expectation disappointed by the non-occurrence of e ’.

‘the order to V’ = ‘the order obeyed by V-ing’ = ‘the order disobeyed by not-Ving’

These are no more than rules for the uses of correlative expressions. These rules are not *reflections* of *de re* internal relations constituting the metaphysical forms of the world. On the contrary, internal relations are the *shadows* of these rules of representation. Instead of speaking of the thought that p , we can equally well speak of the thought that is made true by the fact that p . Rather than speaking of the expectation that Jill will come, we can equally well speak of the expectation that will be fulfilled by Jill’s coming. These are no more than different ways of speaking of one and the same thought or expectation.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein had explained how thought can ‘reach right up to reality’ by reference to the idea that the constituents of thought, that correspond to the simple names in language, have as their meanings the simple objects in reality that are constituents of states of affairs (and hence too of facts). In the *Investigations* he saw that this too is illusion. Language is not ‘pinned’ to reality at all – it is, in a sense, free-floating and

autonomous. Ostensive definitions do not link words and world – they remain within grammar. The sample at which one points in an ostensive definition belong (at least *pro tempore*) to the means of representation, not to what is represented. The world does not consist of facts, and facts are not concatenations of sempiternal objects. Indeed, the postulation of objects (the substance of the world) was misconceived. It is not the task of philosophy to *postulate* anything. But what was licit in the role allocated to the postulated objects of the *Tractatus* is satisfactorily fulfilled by samples belonging to the means of representation.

It is important to realise, because it is currently often obscured, that the grammatical proposition that the thought (or proposition) that *p* is made true by the fact that *p* is not an endorsement of the modern metaphysics of truth-makers. Facts don't make thoughts true in the manner in which killing men makes widows, but rather in the manner in which being an unmarried man makes one a bachelor. Facts are no more 'in the world' than thoughts are 'in the head'. 'The thought that *p*' and 'The thought made true by the fact that *p*' are just two different ways of referring to the same thought, just as 'The vixen howled' and 'The female fox howled' involve two different ways of referring to the same animal. Being a female fox is not a vixen-maker (foxes and vixens make little vixens).

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thought that the method of projection that links picture to what it is a picture of is *thinking the sense of the sentence* – which is *meaning by the sentence the state of affairs it describes* (and so too, meaning by the constituent names of the sentence the objects that are their meanings). It was mental acts of *meaning* that were conceived to breath life into language. Later he realised that meaning something by a word or sentence is not a mental act at all, that there are constraints on what one *can* mean by a

conventional sign one uses, and that he had, in the *Tractatus* confused the lines of projection with the method of projection.

The intentionality of language is not derived from the intrinsic intentionality of thought. Nor is it produced by some hocus-pocus *in the mind*¹⁴— namely imaginary mental acts of meaning or intending. That we can think of the non-existent, that we can believe something that is not the case, that we can say *what* we expect even though *what we expect* has not yet eventuated, all this (and much more) is rendered intelligible by careful investigations of the grammar of our language and our linguistic practices.

4. Crane's flawed criticism

Professor Crane advances what he takes to be a crushing objection to Wittgenstein's elucidation of the core problem of the intentionality of thought and language. The objection is simple: the thought that *p* can be made true by the fact that *q*, for example: the thought (proposition, or expectation) that the postman will deliver the mail tomorrow may in fact be satisfied by Mr Smith's delivering a Christmas card on Christmas Eve. I may have expected the postman to deliver the mail tomorrow, but I did not expect Mr Smith (I did not know that Mr Smith is the postman) to deliver a Christmas card (I was expecting the mail) on Christmas Eve (I didn't know that tomorrow is Christmas Eve). This, Professor Crane avers, shows that Wittgenstein's account is sorely incomplete. Moreover, it shows that a full account of the logic of expectation and its fulfilment would not be grammatical at all. We must reject Wittgenstein's claim that 'it is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make

¹⁴ Not, as Miss Anscombe and Professor Crane would have it 'in the soul'. This mistake in the translation has been corrected in the 4th edition of the *Investigations*. Professor Crane expresses amazement that 'anyone in their right mind' would want to defend either hocus pocus or the soul (p. 95). But not only did the young Wittgenstein want to defend hocus-pocus in the mind, so too did John Searle in his *Intentionality*.

contact' (p. 101). For what we know when we know that the fact that q may satisfy the expectation that p is not a matter of grammar (p. 102). So, 'there is more to the relation between expectation and its fulfilment than grammar' (ibid.).

This is confused. The problem Wittgenstein addressed is set by *an undeniable internal relation* between thought (expectation, wish) or language (proposition, order), on the one hand, and something 'outside it', on the other, namely: a fact, an event, an act – which may or may not obtain, occur, be performed, and indeed may *never* obtain, occur or be performed. How can there be an internal relation between something that occurs or obtains *now*, and something else, which if it is to obtain at all, will obtain only later? How can one *read off* one's current thought, wish or expectation what will subsequently make it true, fulfil it or satisfy it? Does one's thought, wish or expectation *contain* what will make it true, fulfil it or satisfy it? That is absurd – but unless it were so, how could one say what one thought, wished for, or expected in advance of its fulfilment? Or does it contain a *logical picture* (the *Tractatus*), *image* (classical empiricism), or *representation* (contemporary representationalism) of what will make it true, fulfil it, or satisfy it?

This then is the problem. But *there is no internal relation* between the thought that p and the fact that q , or between the wish to have w and being given x , or between the expectation that e will happen, and f 's happening. It is not possible to read off the thought that p the fact that q that non-logically makes it true. One cannot read off the wish to be given a good book tomorrow the event of being given a copy of *War and Peace* on Christmas Day. And one cannot read off the expectation that the postman will deliver the mail tomorrow the event of Mr Smith's delivering a Christmas card on Christmas Eve. So the problems of intentionality simply do not arise when we are not dealing with an internal relation.

It is amusing to note that Wittgenstein was well aware of this issue.¹⁵ He mentions it *en passant* in *Investigations* §441. In our language-games with expressions of wishes, the question of whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise. It would be absurd to suppose (as Russell did in *Analysis of Mind*) that I don't know what I wish until something puts paid to it. For then it might turn out that my wish for an apple is satisfied by a punch in the stomach that makes the wish disappear (PR 64). On the other hand, Wittgenstein notes, 'the word "wish" is also used in this way: "I don't know myself what I wish for".' He does not comment on this, but the required elaboration is obvious: this is not a case of *ignorance* (of my having a wish but not knowing what it is), but of *indecision* (I need to make up my mind, not peer into it). Wittgenstein then adds a further parenthesis directly pertinent to Professor Crane's 'objection': '(“For wishes themselves are a veil between us and the things wished for.”)' This is a quotation from Goethe's *Herman und Dorothea*, Canto V, line 69, where the pastor pleads with Herman's father to permit the young couple's marriage, even though Dorothea seems to fall short of the father's expectations:

Be not surprised nor embarrassed that now a sudden fulfilment
Of your most cherished wish has arrived; to be sure its appearance
Does not agree with exactness with what you always imagined
Wishes obscure their objective; fulfilment is not as expected.
That which is given comes down from above, in a form which is proper.

This too is obviously no objection to Wittgenstein's account of intentionality. Wittgenstein mentioned the very same point in the *Big Typescript*:

Expectation and event make contact *in language*.
“I said, ‘Leave the room’ and he left the room.”

¹⁵ But not in the passage Professor Crane suggests (PG 162), which has nothing to do with this question, but only with disjunctive expectations.

“I said ‘Leave the room’ and he left the room slowly.”

“I said ‘Leave the room’ and he jumped out of the window.”

A justification is possible here, even when the description of the action isn’t the same as that given by the command. (BT 371).

What ‘justification’ did Wittgenstein have in mind? Obviously this: the order to leave the room is obeyed by jumping out of the window *since jumping out of the window is (one way of) leaving the room!* But one cannot read off the order to leave the room that it will be obeyed by jumping out of the window – there is here no ‘intentional connection’, *unless one supplies the further ‘justification’*.

5. Professor Crane’s misguided conclusion

Professor Crane concludes (wrongly) that the problem of the relationship between thought and reality is not solved by grammatical investigations. So he suggests that we should reconsider the idea that there might be something else that explains the connection, or apparent connection, between an expectation and what fulfils it, a proposition and what makes it true, etc. This ‘something else’, he suggests, is the idea of representation. ‘It is hard to see how we can make any progress in even describing the phenomena’, Professor Crane writes, ‘if we cannot help ourselves to the concept of representation’ (p. 102). This is bizarre, since we have been talking about representations – symbolic representations – all the time. What Professor Crane has in mind, as he then explains, is *mental representation*. Of course, that was what the young Wittgenstein advocated too. He too held that thoughts are mental representations. The older, and wiser, Wittgenstein explained in detail why that is incoherent – for the intentionality of thought is parasitic on the intentionality of language and linguistic representation, and *thoughts are not representations*.

Professor Crane mentions one foolish objection to his representationalist proposal, which he ascribes (without giving chapter and verse) to Max Bennett and myself. The objection is ‘that the idea of representation always implies interpretation’. But, Professor Crane avers, we can reject this ‘assumption’ and in so doing, take our inspiration from Wittgenstein himself. For ‘just as he argued that to solve the rule-following paradox, we need to accept that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” (PI §201), so we can say, in a similar vein, that there is a way of representing the world which does not itself need interpretation’ (pp. 102f.). But this is mistaken, for more reasons than one.

To the best of my knowledge, Max Bennett and I have never suggested that every representation requires an interpretation. What is true is that *it is possible* to ask for an interpretation of any representation. It *makes sense* to ask of any given representation ‘What does this mean?’ or ‘What does this represent?’ On the other hand, it makes no sense to ask of one’s own thought ‘What does this mean?’, let alone ‘What does this represent?’ It makes no sense to say of a person that he interprets his thought (let alone that he might misinterpret it) *in order to determine what he thinks*. As Wittgenstein put it, ‘thought (meaning (*meinen*)) is the last interpretation’ (PG 144f.; BB 33f.). But is there any such thing as a representation that *cannot* be misunderstood or misinterpreted? That is *one* reason why thoughts are not representations. A second reason is the converse: if thoughts were mental representations, then a report of what one thought would have to leave out what one meant. But that is absurd. A third reason runs deeper. Every representation must have non-representational properties in virtue of which it is a representation (the ink with which one writes must have some colour, the words one utters must be uttered with some tone or timbre, the painting one paints must be painted on some material or other, with one kind of paint or another). Otherwise it would

not *be* a representation. But *thoughts are all message and no medium*. That is why they are not representations.

Of course there is a way of representing the world which does itself not (normally) need an interpretation – namely our humdrum, common or garden way of representing things in ordinary discourse. For most of our utterances *do not* need an interpretation. But *if* there is any misunderstanding, they *can* be given one. Thinking, however, is not a way of *representing* anything. The harmony between thought and reality is orchestrated *in language*, not in the mind and not between the mind and the world either. And one can hear and understand the harmony only by listening to grammar.

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